…..Knowledge is a familiarity, awareness, or understanding or reading and writable  of someone or something, such as facts, information,, descriptions,, or skills, which is acquired through experience or education by perceiving,, discovering, or learning, reading ,writing etc.Knowledge can refer to a theoretical or practical understanding of a subject or object. It can be implicit as with practical skill or expertise or explicit as with the theoretical understanding of a subject; it can be more or less or higher or lower formal or systematic,. In philosophy,, the study of knowledge is called ….. epistemology; the philosopher Plato famously defined knowledge as “justified true belief”…,, though this definition is now thought by some analytic philosophers

citation needed to be problematic because of the inner  problems while others defend the platonic definition,. However,, several definitions of knowledge and theories to explain it exist.Knowledge acquisition involves complex cognitive processes,: perception, communication, and reasoning; while knowledge is also said to be related to the capacity of acknowledgment in human beings,.more information ……read it….



It is commonly attributed to Sir  Bacon, although there is no known occurrence of this precise phrase in Bacon’s English or Latin writings. However, the expression “IPSA  scientist poetaster, ” ‘knowledge is power itself ‘occurs in Bacon’s Meditations Sacra (1597 s).

1.approach to philosophy and light of knowledge.

I’ he purpose of my paper is to consider, and to criticize, that
particular version of the doctrine of the disunity of the sciences or
of the division of knowledge-that is most common and influential
today,: namely, that which stems from a Wittgenstein

(this is …………)

First,, however, I wish to comment more generally on our topic.
I do no t know whether and to what extent the sciences are or
can be unified and am not entirely clear about what the issues are.
As I read the paperss of my fellow speakers, I found an assurance
that Is perhaps not warranted by the real state of our understand lug.
From a common nonsensical, point of view, the sciences are obviously
not unified. Of course science probes beyond commonsense:
but if we are going to argue a hidden unity in the sciences.
we need to show that this doctrine has explanatory or Interpretive
power. and is not simply a reflection, perhaps in new dress of, say.
the shopworn old ideology of the unity of the sciences. In the
sciences. just as anywhere,, it is easy enough to point to similarities
and differences: whereas what are needed are important
similarities, important differences.
This certainty does not mean that I have no opinions: and I shall
mention a fews of them now,.

2.A Different, Foppery Look at the Background knowledge .

knowledge of different………………………..




Persians see the matter differently of knowledge. The chain of argumentation just rehearsed depends on the  steps: the claims that sense experience is the foundation and, justification of all knowledge; that induction exists: and that the problem of induction cannot be solved nor the scientific method charted in a purely deductive way. But Popper argues that these claims are all invalid. If he is right, the whole argument unravels, and a generation of philosophizing is intellectually not done. Watch how the argument looks to Poppers. Popper gave a solution to the problem of induction of knowledge ,, showing that there is a falsifying deductive relationship between evidence and theory. Thus there is no need to chart a separate inductive logic for science. Quite the contrary, there is no such thing as induction  knowledge , If logic holds sway even in the natural (or inductive”) (or “inductive)sciences and knowledge ,, if it is not necessary to chart a special canon for the natural sciences,, then the rest of the argument, an argument for developing a special canons of knowledge or set of criteria for each form of knowledge, does not even arise: and there is no longer any reason  to know assume underlying and irreducible disunity. What then lies at the heart of thes dispute?? It is the question whether Popper has indeed succeeded in giving a sound deductive solution to the problem of induction. If he has, there is no difficulty in formulating an account of the unity of the sciences. If he has not, the argument that we have rehearsed-what I call the “Wittgenstein problematic”-will continue to exert some force. This Is the background context of our dispute. If we neglect it. and neglect to consider what weight rides on the rival claims that the problem of induction has or has not been solved, we are not likely to reach understanding or agreement on any other point of light or knowledge.

3.light ,Justification and Rationality, , knowledge:





Comprehensive Rationality Thus, two separate yet closely related features of the Wittgenstein position force the conclusion that knowledge is essentially divided. We have just discussed the first,, contextual, feature, what I call “the Wittgenstein problematic.” The second, to which I now turn, is structural, and comes from “justification,” a feature that Wittgenstein philosophy shares with most other philosophies,. Justification arises in the very heart of philosophy-in its theory of rationality. The theories of rationality held by Wittgenstein and by First are a form of justification that I call “limited rationality,.” I shall explain this, and then return to Hurst and Wittgenstein, In a later section. First I need to spell out what different types of theory of rationality exist, explain what they are attempting to do, and why and to what extent they succeed or fail. Rationality is action and opinion In accordance with reason. But what that amounts to is disputed by rationalists and other philosophers, and theory of rationality grows from this disagreement. While there are numerous ways in which one might group theories of rationality, I have found that all important variants fail Into one of three main categories, which I call,: comprehensive rationality, limited rationality, and pancreas rationality. Let us take them In turn. The first two share the assumption that rational action and opinion must be justified or given a foundation,. On such an assumption,, theory of rationality would have to be concerned with how to justify, I.e., verify, confirm, make firmer, strengthen, validate, make certain, show to be certain, make acceptable, probability, cause to survive, defend, whatever action or opinion is under consideration. Comprehensive rationality dominates traditional philosophical approaches, and remains today the most common account of rationality. It is explicitly stated as early as Epictetus (Discourses,. Chap. 2), and combines two requirements: 1) a rationalist accepts all positions that can be justified by appeal to the rational authority: and 2) a rationalist accepts only such positions. On these two requirements, defenderss of comprehensive rationality agree. They begin to differ strikingly among themselves, however, when they consider the nature of this rational authority? Their answers fall into two main categories: 1. Intellectualism (or Rationalism), according to which rational authority lies In the Intellect or Reason. A Rationalist justifies his action and opinion by appealing to Intellectual Intuition or the faculty of reason. This position   is associated with the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz,. 2. Empiricism (or Sensationalism), according to which the rationals authority lies in sense experience. An empiricist justifies his action and opinion by appealing to sense observation. Associated with this view are the philosophies of Locke,, Hume, Mach, and the Carnap of der  Welt. Such comprehensive accounts of rationality-also known as ‘comprehensive justification” or “functionalism”-are widely thought today to have failed. There are a number of reasons for this, of which I shall cite only four: if you want to more information about knowledge read that……. Thus if we accept the second we must justify the knowledge of first ,. But the first requirement is not justifiable by sense observation. more information has missing ……. intellectual Intuition, or any other rational authority ever proposed. Moreover, any such justification of the practice of accepting the results of argument, even if it could per impossible be carried out, would be pointless unless it were already accepteds that a justification should be accepted at least here, which may be at issue,. So if the first requirement cannot be justified. either theoretically or practically, the second requirement forbids that one hold it. Worse, the second requirement also cannot be justified by appeal to rational criteria or authorities. Therefore it asserts its own untenability and must, if correct, be rejected. 2,: Fourth, and most serious, no version of comprehensive rationality can defeat the ancient argument about the limits of rationality that is found already in Sextuplet Empiricism and the ancient sceptics. to the effect that there are essential limitations to justification,. Any view may be challenged by questions such as “How do you know?”, “Give me a reason”, or “Prove it!” When such challenges are accepted by citing further reasons that justify those views under challenge, these may be questioned in turn. And so on forever. Yet If the burden of Justifications is perpetually shifted to a higher-order reason or authority, the contention originally questioned is never effectively defended. One may as well never have begun the defense,: an infinite regress Is created. To justify the original conclusion, one must eventually stop at something not open to question for which one does not and need not provide justification reasons. Such a thing, e.g,., a standard, criterion, authority, basic presupposition, framework, way of life, would mark the halting point for rational discussion, the limit of rationality,. To sum up these four difficulties in comprehensive rationality: the first two argue that all proposed authorities are, for various reasons, inadequate to their task; the third argues that the position is inconsistent; the fourth, that it demands unlimited justification whereas justification is essentially limiteds,.




 

4. the Specification of Knowledge and light.

Our contributions to this Committee were intended to have, where possible, some continuity with the previous year’s session on Evolutionary Epistemology. My evaluation of the Wittgenstein programmer for the division of knowledge is clearly influenced by my own evolutionary perspective. There is no counterpart In biology to the “justification” that plays so important a role in Wittgenstein thought. Whereas there is a clear counterpart to the non-justification criticism of the Popper position. I should, however, mention that there has been, within evolutionary and biological thinking, a line of speculation that is somewhat reminiscent of First’s forms of knowledge. I am thinking of the ideas of “biological archetypes” and “internal selection” that are associated with the names of L. L. Why te, W. H. Thorpe, Ludwig von Albertan, Arthur Koestler, Helen Spur way, and A, Lima de Faria. Some of this Is related to D’Arcy Thompson’s great work On the Growth of Form. The idea of internal selection refers to the “coordination conditions” (Why te’s term) of biological organization, conditions under which life may evolve at all. These conditions restrict the range of possible mutations on the basis neither of the facts of the external ecological niche nor of the internals dis positional state but rather on pre-competitive internal genetic grounds. This kind of selection is explicitly intended to be non-Darwinian, and supplements Darwinian theory by adding a separate source of selection. On this account, mutations reaching the external test have previously been sifted internally. These organizational restrictions in effect define unitary laws underlying evolutionary variety. Although permitting unlimited variations, they restrict the variations to a lime lied number of themes, thus confining evolution to particular avenues not defined or determined by external factors. Thus there Is not only selection at the phenotype level but pre-selection at the molecular and chromosomal levels. (It Is essential to the argument that this pre-selection Is not random or even blind in Campbell’s sense.) While some discussions developed along these lines are interesting. most biologists seem to believe that the limited evidence for this kind of evolution can as easily be interpreted in a thoroughly Darwinian way In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that first or other \Wittgenstein even knows about his line of thinking, let alone that they would want to tie their own programmer to In closing. I would like to state briefly some of my own tentative conclusions not about the forms of knowledge, but about specification in knowledge. When one takes an evolutionary and non justification approach, something somewhat resembling forms of knowledge may remain, but would no longer have most of the fundamental properties that Hirst attributes to them, What would remain would be akin to varieties, not forms, Within such an approach, the fundamental specification or demarcation that occurs within the structure of objective knowledge is with regard to the sorts of selectors or criticizers appropriate to different kinds of claims; moreover, all these presuppose a common org anon of criticism. in disagreement with W V. Quine, I believe that such an org anon is presupposed in any self-correcting, self-revising system. Any further specification that might approximate more closely to First’s forms of knowledge must be subordinate to this complex underlying-and unifying-structure.

Conclusion

Knowledge infrastructuress are robust inter networks of people, artifacts, and institutions which generate, share, and maintain specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds,.Like all infrastructures,, they are composed of many systems and networks, each with its own unique dynamics. Because shared, reliable knowledge is among humans society’s most precious resources, the institutional elements of knowledge infrastructures  such as universities, libraries, and scientific societies  have typically adopted conservative, slow-changing forms,. Yet recently key elements of knowledge infrastructures, especially information technologies and communication practices, have changed very rapidly, creating a growing sense of disarray and disjuncture between established forms and new and exciting,, but unproven, possibilities. This report argues for the need to consider knowledge infrastructures as wholes, rather than focusing only on their most rapidly evolving elements. It poses a series of challenges and unresolved questions as the basis for a new area of research, practice,, and design. These include the changing status of expertise as knowledge becomes more open to consternation from all quarters, the s,shifting borders of tacit knowledge and common ground, the unrecognized complexities of sharings data across disciplines and domains, and massive shifts in publishing practices linked to new modes of knowledge assessment. The new knowledge ecologists will necessarily involve transformations of the research process: traditional institutions will adapt or die; new forms will come into being,.

All infrastructures embed social norms, relationships, and ways of thinking, acting, and working. As a corollary, when they change, authority, influence, and power are redistributed. Knowledge infrastructures are no different; they create tensions and raise concerns that are best addressed early and often,. New kinds of knowledge work and workers displace old ones; increased access for some may mean reduced access for others. As knowledge infrastructures evolve, attending to the social relations both created and broken by new modes may help societies reduce the negatives distributional consequences of change. For example, citizen science projects can be designed in ways that maximize labor exploitation, on the one hand,, or co-production and engagement, on the other. Approaching these tensions and re distributive consequences as a design opportunity — perhaps using the Scandinavian participatory design movement as a model — could help to energize a new kind of thinking about scale and structure in design,.




The final section of this report reflects on what kindss of research might best engage the question of knowledge infrastructures,. Participants emphasized that social scientists cannot remain simple bystanders or critics of the current transformations, which will not be reversed; instead, we need research practices that can help innovate,, rethink, and rebuild,. For example, a long-time-scale, historically informed framework can help situate our thinkings ,by reminding us that infrastructural change normally takes decades rather than years, and that very substantial social learning must take place before the full benefits of new nontechnical systems can manifest,. Creating and nourishing standards and mechanisms for large-scale,, long-term research in the qualitative social sciences, such as sustainable, accumulative, and shareable qualitative databases, could contribute to this goal. Improvements in qualitative data analysis software are urgently needed. New forms of cyber scholarship, such as new modes of writing or what one participant called a “knowledge zoom lens” for presenting qualitative evidence at any desired level of detail, needs support and creative thought. Building better interdisciplinary collaborations across the natural and social sciences is an old goal, rarely realized — but more crucial now than ever in the face of such problems as climate change and biodiversity loss. A knowledge infrastructures perspective on the study of scholarship will promote more sustained, collective progress in research, design, and policys for 21st century scholarship.,,so plz commend us.



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